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OPINION 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 Shaun Graves appeals his conviction and sentence for 
unlawful possession of a firearm, arguing that his suppression 
motion was wrongfully denied and that he was improperly 
sentenced as a career offender.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will affirm both the conviction and the sentence. 
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I.  FACTS 
On the evening of October 16, 2014, Officer Dennis 
Simmons of the Harrisburg Police Department was 
conducting an undercover surveillance operation in a high-
crime area of the city while dressed in plainclothes and sitting 
in an unmarked car.  While in his car, Officer Simmons heard 
a radio dispatch about possible gunshots in an unspecified 
area east of his location.  The dispatch went on to describe 
two potential suspects walking away from the location of the 
gunshots:  Both men wore dark-colored hooded sweatshirts 
and were described as calmly walking west, away from the 
gunshots.  Less than five minutes later, Officer Simmons 
observed two men—including Graves—in dark-colored 
hooded sweatshirts walking west towards Simmons’ vehicle.  
Officer Simmons then drove around the block to the next 
street in order to intercept the two men.  At this point, he 
noticed Graves walking with a “pronounced, labored” gait 
suggesting that “he may have concealed something heavy in 
his waistband or pocket on [his right] side.”1  Officer 
Simmons also testified that Graves held his arms in a tense 
manner, further suggesting that he was armed. 
 
As Graves and the other individual passed Officer 
Simmons’ vehicle, Officer Simmons made eye contact with 
Graves; Graves raised his hands over his head in the shape of 
a Y, and Officer Simmons nodded.  Officer Simmons testified 
at the suppression hearing that Graves’ behavior “was 
consistent with a drug dealer or someone who sells something 
illegal in the street.”2  Officer Simmons admitted, however, 
                                              
1 JA 25. 
2 JA 27. 
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that “it could be more like a challenge, more or less someone 
saying what are you looking at, why are you looking at me 
that way.”3  Officer Simmons then proceeded to drive one 
block south and wait.  Graves left his companion and turned 
south, walking directly towards Officer Simmons’ car at a 
quickened pace.  As Graves neared the vehicle, Officer 
Simmons displayed his badge, yelled “Police,” and 
handcuffed Graves.   
 
Believing that there was a possibility that Graves was 
armed, Officer Simmons conducted a pat-down search of 
Graves’ clothing.  During this pat-down, Officer Simmons 
felt “multiple small hard objects” in both of Graves’ front 
pockets.  The feel of these objects was consistent with that of 
crack cocaine.4  Officer Simmons proceeded to remove the 
objects from Graves’ pockets.  They turned out to be multiple 
packets of the antidepressant Depakote5 and one live .22 
caliber bullet.  At this point, other officers arrived.  After 
being read his rights, Graves told Officer Simmons that he 
carried the bullet as a tribute to his brother, who had been 
killed by a .22 caliber weapon.  Graves did not answer Officer 
Simmons’ questions about whether he had a gun for the 
bullet.  Officer Simmons then placed Graves in another 
officer’s vehicle, and Graves was taken approximately two 
blocks south.  Upon further questioning, Graves admitted that 
he had a loaded .380 pistol in his boot, where it had fallen 
                                              
3 Id. 
4 JA 31. 
5 Depakote, a prescription medication for certain mental 
health conditions, is not a controlled substance for purposes 
of federal law.  Graves purportedly told Simmons, however, 
that he planned to sell the Depakote as crack cocaine.   
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from his waistband during his arrest.  Graves maintained, 
however, that he was holding the gun only temporarily for his 
companion. 
 
Graves was subsequently charged with one count of 
possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(k) and 924(a)(1)(B) and one 
count of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 924(e).  He filed a motion 
to suppress all physical evidence and statements obtained at 
the time of his arrest.   
 
At the suppression hearing before the District Court, 
Officer Simmons testified to the above facts, as well as about 
his nine years of experience as a police officer, during which 
he had made hundreds of arrests for drug offenses and violent 
crimes.  After crediting Officer Simmons’ testimony in its 
entirety, the District Court denied Graves’ motion to 
suppress.  Graves then entered a guilty plea to one count of 
unlawful possession of a firearm.6  At sentencing, the District 
Court treated Graves as a career offender over Graves’ 
objection, finding that his two prior convictions for North 
Carolina common law robbery were the categorical 
equivalent of the enumerated crime of robbery in § 2K2.1 of 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.  Applying this enhancement, 
the District Court sentenced Graves to a term of 
imprisonment of 100 months—the bottom of the Guidelines 
range. 
 
                                              
6 Graves’ guilty plea was conditioned on his right to appeal 
the propriety of the denial of his motion to suppress and of 
the sentence imposed. 
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Graves appealed. 
II.  DISCUSSION7 
 Graves raises two issues on appeal.  First, he appeals 
the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that Officer 
Simmons lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him 
or, in the alternative, that Officer Simmons exceeded the 
scope of a valid frisk by focusing on more than just potential 
weapons on his person.  Second, he appeals the District 
Court’s decision to treat North Carolina common law robbery 
as the categorical equivalent of generic robbery and the 
resultant enhancement of his sentence.  We treat each issue in 
turn.  Because the facts underlying both issues are not in 
dispute, we need only determine their legal significance; our 
review of such legal questions is plenary.8 
 
A.  The Search 
 Graves advances two theories why Officer Simmons’ 
behavior ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment.  First, he argues 
that Officer Simmons lacked reasonable suspicion to justify 
                                              
7 The District Court had jurisdiction over Graves’ criminal 
prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
8 See United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 660 (3d Cir. 
2012) (citation omitted) (suppression); United States v. 
Johnson, 587 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) 
(career offender enhancement). 
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stopping and frisking him.9  Second, he argues that Officer 
Simmons exceeded the proper scope of an investigatory 
search by searching him for drugs, rather than weapons.  Each 
argument is addressed separately. 
 
Although the Fourth Amendment generally requires 
that a seizure be effectuated pursuant to a warrant supported 
by probable cause, an officer may constitutionally conduct a 
“brief, investigatory stop [and frisk]” without a warrant if he 
has “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity 
is afoot.”10  This “reasonable suspicion” standard is lower 
than probable cause; rather, an officer need only “a minimal 
level of objective justification”11 that is “specific to the 
person who is detained.”12  We review the totality of the 
circumstances leading up to the moment of the defendant’s 
seizure.13  In doing so, however, we “give considerable 
deference to police officers’ determinations of reasonable 
suspicion” given “their own experience and specialized 
training to make inferences from and deductions about the 
cumulative information available to them that ‘might well 
                                              
9 Although raised as two separate issues in Graves’ brief, the 
standards governing both are identical in this case; as such, 
both are addressed together. 
10 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citation 
omitted). 
11 United States v. Whitfield, 634 F.3d 741, 744 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(considering “the totality of the circumstances” and taking 
into account “everything that occurred until the moment [the 
defendant] was seized . . .”). 
12 United States v. Navedo, 694 F.3d 463, 468 (3d Cir. 2012). 
13 Whitfield, 634 F.3d at 744. 
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elude an untrained person.’”14  Thus, a trained officer may 
find reasonable suspicion “based on acts capable of innocent 
explanation.”15 
 
Although Officer Simmons acted on limited 
information in stopping Graves, we nonetheless believe that 
the totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable 
suspicion.  First, Officer Simmons explained that he was 
parked in a high crime area.16  Second, Graves and his 
companion were leaving the scene of the gunshots dressed in 
similar garb to the suspects described in the police broadcast.  
Third, Officer Simmons observed Graves walking in a 
manner indicating, in Officer Simmons’ experience, that 
Graves was armed.  
 
While these factors standing in isolation may not have 
been sufficient,17 together they satisfied the low threshold of 
reasonable suspicion—particularly in light of the close 
                                              
14 United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278, 290 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(citations omitted). 
15 Whitfield, 634 F.3d at 744 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
16 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (noting that location in a 
high crime area is “among the relevant contextual 
considerations” in determining the reasonableness of a stop). 
17 See United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 247-48 (3d Cir. 
2006) (finding that the bare fact that defendants matched a 
generalized description of suspects as black men wearing 
dark sweatshirts insufficient to satisfy reasonable suspicion); 
United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(noting that evidence of gun possession may not, standing 
alone, be sufficient to create reasonable suspicion). 
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temporal proximity between the gunshots and Officer 
Simmons’ encounter with Graves.  Further, Officer Simmons’ 
suspicions were increased when he observed Graves raise his 
arms over his head in a manner consistent with that of an 
individual seeking to sell drugs, or, in the alternative, looking 
at Officer Simmons in a challenging manner.  Graves then 
departed from his companion to approach Officer Simmons’ 
vehicle, quickening his pace.  This combination of events 
gave rise to the reasonable inference by Officer Simmons that 
Graves was armed and engaged in potentially unlawful 
conduct.18  On appeal, Graves advances innocent 
explanations for all his conduct and points to other evidence 
undercutting the likelihood that he was engaged in criminal 
activity.  However, the mere possibility of such an innocent 
explanation does not undermine Officer Simmons’ 
determination at the time. 
 
Accordingly, we find that Officer Simmons had 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was underway 
when he stopped and frisked Graves. 
 
However, when an officer exceeds the proper bounds 
of a search, an individual subject to a valid investigatory stop 
and frisk may nonetheless assert constitutional error.  An 
officer may only “search . . . the outer clothing of [seized] 
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be 
                                              
18 See United States v. Murray, 821 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 
2016) (finding that evidence of defendant’s involvement in 
drug trafficking was sufficient to support reasonable 
suspicion that he was armed). 
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used to assault him.”19  While “[t]he purpose of this limited 
search is not to discover evidence of crime,” the Supreme 
Court has held that an officer “may seize contraband detected 
during the lawful execution of [such a] search” under the 
plain feel doctrine.20  Once the validity of a protective frisk is 
established, “the dispositive question . . . is whether the 
officer who conducted the search was acting within . . . lawful 
bounds . . . at the time he gained probable cause to believe 
that the lump in [the defendant’s pocket] was contraband.”21  
We must focus on “whether the officer had probable cause to 
believe an object was contraband before he knew it not to be 
a weapon and whether he acquired that knowledge in a 
manner consistent with a routine frisk.”22 
 
Graves argues that Officer Simmons was not entitled 
to conduct any further search of his person once Officer 
Simmons realized that the objects in his pockets were not 
weapons.  In so arguing, however, Graves advances a broad 
theory.  Graves proposes that if a police officer is conducting 
a protective frisk, by definition, he must determine if what he 
is feeling is a weapon.  Graves asserts that, if Officer 
Simmons determined that the right front pocket did not hold a 
weapon, his search of the interior of the pocket was 
impermissible; a determination that an object is not a weapon 
must end the search. 
                                              
19 Navedo, 694 F.3d at 467-68 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (second alteration in original)). 
20 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373-75 (1993) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
21 Id. at 377. 
22 United States v. Yamba, 506 F.3d 251, 259 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(emphasis removed) (citations omitted). 
11 
 
Our decision in United States v. Yamba forecloses this 
argument.  There, an officer, conducting a protective frisk, 
felt a plastic bag containing a soft, “spongy-like” substance.23  
The officer’s testimony that this “feeling” was, in his 
experience, consistent with the feeling of marijuana was 
sufficient to create probable cause justifying removal of the 
bag.  We held that the removal of the bag did not exceed the 
bounds of a protective frisk merely because the officer knew 
that the bag itself contained no weapons; rather, we focused 
on whether the officer encountered the contraband “before he 
determined that Yamba had no gun on his person.”24 
 
The same result is compelled here.  In conducting the 
frisk of Graves’ pockets, Officer Simmons testified that he 
knew the materials in Graves’ pockets were consistent in 
feeling with crack cocaine.  The District Court credited this 
testimony.  Indeed, Graves did not identify any other 
plausible explanations for the feeling of the objects in his 
pockets.  The feel of these objects, in light of Officer 
Simmons’ experience with narcotics investigations, gave rise 
to probable cause justifying removal of the objects from 
Graves’ pocket.  Moreover, because Officer Simmons had yet 
to determine whether Graves was armed at the time he felt the 
objects, his frisk did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that Officer Simmons did not 
exceed the bounds of a valid protective frisk in removing the 
Depakote and bullet from Graves’ pockets during the course 
of the search. 
 
                                              
23 Id. at 260.  
24 Id. 
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B.  The Sentence 
 Graves next challenges his sentence on the ground that 
the District Court improperly sentenced him as a career 
offender after treating his two prior convictions for North 
Carolina common law robbery as the equivalent of the crime 
of generic federal robbery, as used in the Sentencing 
Guidelines. 
 
Section 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines designates 
an offender as a “career offender” if, as relevant here, he has 
“at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of 
violence or a controlled substance offense.”25  The Guidelines 
define a “crime of violence” as an offense that “has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another, or [] is murder, voluntary 
manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex 
offense, robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful 
possession of a firearm . . . or explosive material . . ..”26 
 
To determinations of whether a prior state court 
conviction constitutes a federally defined crime of violence, 
we apply the categorical approach,27 i.e., we compare the 
elements of the state offense, forming the basis of the 
defendant’s conviction, with the elements of the “generic” 
                                              
25 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). 
26 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).  The offense must also be punishable 
by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, but it is 
uncontested that North Carolina common law robbery 
satisfies this requirement. 
27 Brown, 765 F.3d at 188-89. 
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crime.28  The prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence 
only if the elements of the state offense “are the same as, or 
narrower than, those of the generic offense.”29  If, on the 
other hand, the state offense allows for conviction on a 
broader basis than the generic offense, it may not be 
considered for purposes of sentence enhancement.30  Thus, 
we must first identify the elements of the state offense, then 
identify the elements of the generic offense, and finally 
determine whether the former are the same as or narrower 
than the latter. 
 
The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined 
common law robbery as “the felonious, non-consensual 
taking of money or personal property from the person or 
presence of another by means of violence or fear.”31  North 
Carolina has delineated six necessary elements for common 
law robbery:  (1) the taking away of property; (2) from the 
person or presence of another; (3) without consent; (4) with 
specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of the 
                                              
28 Id. at 189 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 State v. Smith, 292 S.E.2d 264, 270 (N.C. 1982) (citations 
omitted). 
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property; (5) with knowledge of the property’s ownership; 
and (6) through use of violence or putting the victim in fear.32   
 
Only the final element—the use of violence or fear—is 
at issue here.33  North Carolina’s courts have interpreted this 
element as a “force” requirement, explaining that “[a]lthough 
actual force implies personal violence, the degree of force 
used is immaterial, so long as it is sufficient to compel the 
victim to part with his property or property in his 
                                              
32 N.C. Pattern Jury Instructions 217.10; accord State v. 
Lunsford, 49 S.E.2d 410, 412 (N.C. 1948).  Some North 
Carolina courts appear to have collapsed the elements of lack 
of consent and specific intent into the first element.  See, e.g., 
State v. Hedgecoe, 415 S.E.2d 777, 780 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) 
(citation omitted).  The substantive elements, however, 
appear to remain unchanged. 
33 The government does not argue that the possibility that the 
offense be committed through use of violence or through use 
of fear renders North Carolina common law robbery a 
divisible offense, nor would we find any such argument 
convincing.  North Carolina courts do not require that a jury 
unanimously agree as to whether a defendant used violence or 
used fear.  See N.C. Pattern Jury Instructions 217.10; see also 
United States v. Gardner, 823 F.3d 793, 802-03 (4th Cir. 
2016).  Accordingly, the statute is indivisible, insofar as 
“violence” and “fear” are not alternative elements, but 
together form one element of the offense.  Id.; see Descamps 
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2290 (2013) (noting that a 
statute is indivisible, even if it lists alternatives, if the jury 
need not agree as to the exact way in which the defendant 
committed the offense). 
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possession.”34  The parties agree that this interpretation 
means that a defendant may be convicted of North Carolina 
common law robbery even if he used only de minimis force, 
which posed no threat of injury to another.  Convictions for 
common law robbery in North Carolina courts support this 
reading of the offense.  In State v. Chance, for example, the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction where 
the only “force” demonstrated at trial was the defendant’s act 
of pushing the victim’s hands off of a box of cigarettes.35  
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which appears to be the 
only other circuit to consider North Carolina common law 
robbery, has reached the same conclusion.36 
 
Accordingly, we find that North Carolina common law 
robbery requires only the use of de minimis force. 
                                              
34 State v. Carter, 650 S.E.2d 650, 653 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) 
(quoting State v. Sawyer, 29 S.E.2d 34, 37 (N.C. 1944)) 
(emphasis removed). 
35 662 S.E.2d 405 (Table), 2008 WL 2415981, at *3-*4 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2008).  Two U.S. district courts in Tennessee have 
found that North Carolina common law robbery requires 
more than de minimis force.  See Smith v. United States, No. 
2:03 CR 73, 2016 WL 7365634, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 16, 
2016), certificate of appealability denied, No. 17-5016, ECF 
No. 13 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2017); United States v. Smith, No. 
3:13 CR 5, 2016 WL 6875877, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 21, 
2016).  Both decisions have been appealed to the Sixth 
Circuit.  We are not persuaded by the relatively cursory 
discussions of the issue in each opinion, particularly in light 
of North Carolina courts’ repeated pronouncements on the 
issue. 
36 Gardner, 823 F.3d at 803-04. 
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Turning to generic robbery, as used in the Guidelines 
career offender enhancement, we must determine whether 
generic robbery requires the use of more than de minimis 
force.  To identify the elements of the generic offense of 
robbery, we will examine the Model Penal Code (MPC), state 
laws, and learned treatises.37  The MPC defines “robbery” as 
requiring one of three things to occur in the course of 
committing a theft:  the offender must “(a) inflict[] serious 
bodily injury upon another; or (b) threaten[] another with or 
purposively put him in fear of immediate serious bodily 
injury; or (c) commit[] or threaten[] immediately to commit 
any felony of the first or second degree.”  Thus, the MPC 
requires that there be some actual or threatened injury to 
another person for a theft to qualify as robbery.  It appears 
that eleven states follow this MPC framework, requiring some 
sort of actual or future injury for a theft to become robbery.38  
As the parties acknowledged, however, there are thirty-eight 
states which define robbery as theft involving the use of even 
de minimis force.39 
 
                                              
37 See United States v. Marrero, 677 F.3d 155, 165 (3d Cir. 
2012), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, 
133 S. Ct. 2732 (2013). 
38 See United States v. Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d 
376, 380 n.6 (5th Cir. 2006) (collecting statutes), abrogated 
on other grounds by United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541 
(5th Cir. 2013) 
39 See id. at 380 n.5; see also Oral Arg. Recording at 14:45-
15:03,24:35-25:45, 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/16-
3995USAv.Graves.mp3 (agreeing to number of state statutes 
which do not require more than minimal force). 
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This disjunction between the approach of the MPC and 
that of the substantial majority of states has led circuits to 
disagree whether generic robbery requires more than de 
minimis force.  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
suggested that the generic form of robbery requires something 
more than de minimis force, which involves risk of injury to 
another.40  In so holding, it placed primary weight on the 
MPC definition of robbery, as well as the minority of state 
robbery statutes that include some element of injury.  The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has come to the same 
conclusion, although it discussed the question only 
                                              
40 The Fifth Circuit, in one opinion, appeared to adopt the 
view that generic robbery required some risk of injury to the 
victim.  Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d at 380.  Given that 
Rodriguez disavowed the methodology of Santiesteban-
Hernandez, it is not clear whether the Fifth Circuit continues 
to believe that generic robbery requires more than de minimis 
force.  Graves also cites to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Gardner for the proposition that generic robbery should 
require more than de minimis force.  823 F.3d at 803 (quoting 
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 139 (2010)).  
However, Gardner dealt only with the elements clause of the 
career offender enhancement, and thus only asked whether 
North Carolina common law robbery necessarily involved the 
use of violent force.  Gardner did not consider the definition 
of the enumerated crime of generic robbery, as robbery was 
not added to the enumerated offenses clause until after the 
defendant’s sentencing.  Thus, although we have disagreed 
with the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in one previous case, see 
United States v. Cornish, 103 F.3d 302, 309 (3d Cir. 1997), 
we need not examine Gardner too closely here. 
18 
 
cursorily.41  The Seventh and Eleventh Circuit Courts of 
Appeals, however, have disagreed with this conclusion, 
finding that generic robbery comports with the majority of 
state robbery statutes in requiring only minimal force.42  We 
now join the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits and hold that 
generic robbery requires no more than de minimis force. 
 
 This is our first confrontation with a situation where 
the MPC’s definition of a crime differs in an important 
respect from the approach taken by the significant majority of 
states.  Thus, we must determine which of these sources is 
entitled to greater weight in our definition of a generic crime.  
A review of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence demonstrates 
the primacy of state statutes in defining the generic version of 
an offense.  In Taylor v. United States, for example, the Court 
appeared to place a greater weight on the approach of a 
majority of states.  The Court recognized, and rejected, the 
federal common law definition of burglary, finding the 
definition employed by the vast majority of states more 
                                              
41 United States v. Becerril-Lopez, 541 F.3d 881, 891 (9th Cir. 
2008) (adopting the Fifth Circuit’s rationale from 
Santiesteban-Hernandez). 
42 See United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238, 1244 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); United States v. Duncan, 833 
F.3d 751, 755-56 (7th Cir. 2016) (reaffirming holdings 
predating Descamps that generic robbery is satisfied by any 
minor force, such as “a slap in the face”).  The Sixth Circuit 
was faced with the question, but declined to answer it, as it 
held that the defendant had waived the argument on appeal.  
United States v. Elliott, 757 F.3d 492, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2014).  
As discussed supra, note 35, however, an appeal raising this 
issue is currently pending in the Sixth Circuit. 
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persuasive.43  The Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have 
read Taylor to place primary importance on the way the 
majority of states define a crime, even over the approach of 
the MPC.44 
 
We agree with the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit 
in their reading of Taylor, and hold today that the most 
important factor in defining the generic version of an offense 
is the approach of the majority of state statutes defining the 
crime.  Affording predominant weight to the majority of 
states best recognizes that “Congress’ basic goal in passing 
the Sentencing Act was to move the sentencing system in the 
direction of increased uniformity.”45  While the MPC is a 
useful starting point, its definition of “robbery” does not 
                                              
43 495 U.S. 575, 592-96 (1990). 
44 United States v. Soto-Sanchez, 623 F.3d 317, 322 (6th Cir. 
2010) (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598); United States v. 
Garcia-Santana, 774 F.3d 528, 534 (9th Cir. 2014) (reading 
Taylor to suggest that “[t]he generic definition of an offense 
roughly corresponds to the definitions of the offense in a 
majority of the States’ criminal codes” (citation, internal 
quotation marks, and brackets omitted)). 
45 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253 (2005) 
(citations omitted). 
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supersede the way in which the majority of states have 
defined that offense.46 
 
Accordingly, we hold that for purposes of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, generic federal robbery is defined as it 
is in the majority of state robbery statutes, without the 
requirement of more than de minimis force.  Because both 
North Carolina common law robbery and generic federal 
robbery thus contain the same elements, the District Court did 
                                              
46 Santiesteban-Hernandez is, indeed, the only case we have 
identified in which a court chose to follow the MPC 
definition of an offense over that employed by the majority of 
states.  Other courts have rejected generic federal definitions 
insofar as they conflict with the definitions employed by the 
majority of states.  See, e.g., Duncan, 833 F.3d at 755-56; 
Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1244; United States v. De Jesus Ventura, 
565 F.3d 870, 876-78 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (defining kidnapping 
in accordance with the definition employed by most states, 
rather than that used in the MPC, and describing state 
definitions as “[m]ost critical[]” in the process).  The Fourth 
Circuit appears to have recognized this, rejecting elements in 
an MPC definition of an offense where they conflict with the 
approach of the majority of states.  See United States v. 
Flores-Granados, 783 F.3d 487, 496 (4th Cir. 2015).  We do 
not suggest, however, that the approach of the majority of 
states will always be dispositive in crafting any federal 
definition of a crime; rather, it is only the most important of 
the factors to be considered by the district court in defining a 
federal offense.  In crafting a generic definition, courts should 
also consider various factors such as the margin of the 
majority, contrary legislative history, and other evidence of 
congressional intent. 
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not err in treating Graves’ convictions for North Carolina 
common law robbery as the enumerated crime of robbery and 
applying the career offender enhancement to his sentence. 
 
III. 
 In light of the foregoing, we will affirm both the 
conviction and the sentence of the District Court. 
  
